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FAMILY LAW-SUPPORT-THE NATURAL FATHER OF A CHILD BORN
OUT OF WEDLOCK MAY NOT ASSERT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST




L. Pamela P. v. Frank S. (N.Y. 1983)
In March 1980, L. Pamela P. gave birth to a child out of wedlock.1 She
subsequently instituted a paternity action against Frank S. seeking support
for the illegitimate child. 2 After the New York Family Court entered an
order of filiation, 3 Frank S. asserted as a defense to his potential support
obligation that Pamela P. had purposefully deceived him by representing
that she was using contraceptives.' The family court found that Pamela P.
1. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 110 Misc. 2d 978, 979, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1981).
2. L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 59 N.Y.2d 1, 449 N.E.2d 713, 462 N.Y.S.2d 819
(1983). Frank S. is Frank Serpico, the police officer who led a crusade to stamp out
police corruption approximately 10 years ago. See Fox, Fathers'Deception Claims Barred
in Paternity Suits, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1982, at 1, col. 2. See also P. MAAS, SERPICO
(1973).
3. 59 N.Y.2d at 1, 449 N.E.2d at 714, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 820. The family court
concluded that Pamela P. had met her burden of showing paternity by clear and
convincing evidence. See id. Prior to adjudication of any support issue, paternity
must be established. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 511, 542, 545 (McKinney 1975). Pater-
nity may be established by two types of physiological tests. See Pamela P. v. Frank S.,
110 Misc. 2d 978, 979 n.2, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 n.2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981). Prior to
1981, the results of blood tests were admissible only where they definitively disproved
paternity. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 532 (McKinney 1975). However, in 1981, the stat-
ute was amended to allow admission of Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) test re-
sults, a type of blood test, where they aid in proving or disproving paternity, unless
other blood tests have disproved paternity. 1981 N.Y. Laws 9, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 532(a) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
Paternity was proven in L. Pamela P. through both in-court testimony and the
use of the HLA test. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 110 Misc. 2d at 979, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
Pamela P. testified during a family court hearing that her only sex partner during the
conception period was Frank S. Id. Furthermore, the HLA analysis showed "that
the 'plausibility' of respondent's paternity was 0.997." Id. at n.2.
4. 59 N.Y.2d at 4, 449 N.E.2d at 714, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 820. Frank S. testified
that in response to his questions regarding her use of contraception, Pamela P. had
told him that she was using birth control pills. 110 Misc. 2d at 979-80, 443 N.Y.S.2d
at 344. At trial, Pamela P. denied discussing contraception with Frank S., but admit-
ted that she had not been using any type of contraception despite the fact that they
had engaged in intercourse during the most fertile phase of her monthly cycle. Id. at
980, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 344 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981). A witness who had carried on a
sexual relationship with Pamela P. until approximately two months prior to the date
of the child's conception testified that he had terminated their relationship because
Pamela P. wanted to have a child and was no longer using contraceptives. Id. The
witness further testified that when he told Pamela P. that he was not willing to father
(185)
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had deceived Frank S. with regard to her use of contraception 5 and held that
such circumstances warranted suspension of the customary rule that child
support be apportioned equitably between the parents according to their
respective means.6 Rather, the court held that Frank S. was liable for only
that amount by which the mother's means were insufficient to meet the
needs of the child.
7
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
8
refused to recognize the defense of misrepresentation in a child support pro-
her child, she replied that she would have a child by Frank S., with or without
Frank's consent, and would not even tell him that she had stopped using birth con-
trol pills. Id.
Frank S. also argued that the imposition of a support award against him under
these circumstances would be an infringement of his constitutional right to privacy in
sexual matters and, more specifically, his right to decide for himself whether to father
a child. 59 N.Y.2d at 5-6, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. Freedom of
choice in reproductive matters is a particular application of the constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy, or "right to engage in certain highly personal activities." J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 523-28
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. For a discussion of the constitutional right to
privacy, see notes 71-77 and accompanying text infra.
5. 59 N.Y.2d at 4, 449 N.E.2d at 714, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
6. Id., 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. The customary rule is contained
in the New York Family Court Act which states, "The court shall direct the parent or
parents possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means to pay. . . a fair and
reasonable sum according to thezr respective means . . . for such child's support and edu-
cation ..... " N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83) (emphasis ad-
ded). For cases discussing this proportionality rule, see, e.g., Morrow v. Morrow, 62
A.D.2d 1142, 1143, 404 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768 (1978) (modifying the child support award
in light of the father's changed financial obligations); Tessler v. Siegel, 59 A.D.2d
846, 846-47, 399 N.Y.S.2d 218, 218-19 (1977) (remanding the case to the family court
to fashion a support award according to the proportionality rule) (quoting Carter v.
Carter, 58 A.D.2d 438, 447, 397 N.Y.S.2d 88, 94 (1977)).
7. 59 N.Y.2d at 4, 449 N.E.2d at 714, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. The family court
held that both constitutional and common law principles mandated such a result.
110 Misc. 2d at 979, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The court asserted that Pamela P. should
not be permitted to benefit financially from her misrepresentation at Frank S.'s ex-
pense, noting that it is "[clonsistent with the judicial function of following an equita-
ble approach in support cases [for the] court [to] consider the inequitable conduct of
one who invokes its relief." 110 Misc. 2d at 982, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (quotation and
citations omitted). Moreover, the court asserted, application of the customary rule
"would raise constitutional doubt under the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 984, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 347. The court noted, however, that the welfare of the child is the para-
mount concern of the court in a support proceeding and cautioned that the new rule
must never be applied to the detriment of the child. Id.
Finding that Pamela P. was unable to bear a large portion of the child's needs
which totalled $945 per month, the family court ordered Frank S. to pay $790 per
month for the child's support. 59 N.Y.2d at 4 n.*, 449 N.E.2d at 715 n.*, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 821 n.*.
8. 88 A.D.2d 865, 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1982). The nomenclature of the New York
court system differs from that of most other states. The Supreme Court of New York
is, in both law and equity, the court of general jurisdiction. N.Y. CONST. art. VI &
VII(a). Other courts, such as the family court, have been established by statute pur-
suant to constitutional authority and given concurrent original jurisdiction over spe-
cific proceedings. See id. § 13; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 113-115 (McKinney Supp.
[Vol. 29: p. 185
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ceeding and modified the support award to comport with the traditional
rule.9 The New York Court of Appeals' 0 affirmed, holding that the natural
father of a child born out of wedlock may not assert as a defense against his
support obligation the mother's deliberate misrepresentation that she was
using contraception. L. Pamela P v. Frank S., 59 N.Y.2d 1, 449 N.E.2d 713,
462 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1983).
Throughout history, the illegitimate child"1 has been the subject of
great societal scorn and discrimination. 12 For example, under early English
1982). For an explanation of the concurrent nature of the family court's original
jurisdiction, see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 114 Practice Commentary.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York has original, imme-
diate appellate, and final appellate jurisdiction in certain cases. See N.Y. CONST. art.
VI, § 4; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 3222 (McKinney 1970) (original jurisdiction); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. R. 5501(c), 5701-04 (McKinney 1978) (immediate appellate jurisdiction); N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. R. 5501(b) (McKinney 1978) (implied final appellate jurisdiction, given
the limits on appellate jurisdiction of New York Court of Appeals).
The highest court in New York is the court of appeals, which exercises final
appellate review of questions of law only, unless the judgment entered below is of
death or represents a reversal or modification of the trial court's judgment based on a
new finding of fact. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 5501 (b), 5601-
02, 5611-15 (McKinney 1978).
The case at hand involved two hearings in the family court, an appeal to the
appellate division and finally an appeal to the court of appeals. See 59 N.Y.2d at 4-5,
449 N.E.2d at 714-15, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 820-21.
9. 59 N.Y.2d at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. The appellate court
held that once paternity had been established, a family court judge was "bound by
the statute" to consider only the child's needs and the parents' means in fashioning a
support order. 88 A.D.2d at 865, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
The court also summarily dismissed the father's constitutional contention, stat-
ing that an inquiry into a mother's use of birth control and any assertions pertaining
thereto would itself involve "an impermissible invasion of 'the zone of privacy cre-
ated by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.' " 88 A.D.2d at 866, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 767.
Thus, the appellate division court applied the customary support allocation rule,
and ordered Frank S. to pay $945 per month. 88 A.D.2d at 866, 451 N.Y.2d at 767.
For a discussion of the customarily applied support allocation rule, see note 6 and
accompanying text supra.
10. Judge Wachtler wrote the opinion of the court in which Chief Judge Cooke
and Judges Jasen, Jones, Fuchsberg, Meyer and Simons concurred.
In regard to the father's constitutional challenge, the court concluded that no
recognized aspect of the father's right to privacy in sexual matters had been violated.
59 N.Y.2d 1, 449 N.E.2d 713, 462 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1983).
11. At common law, an illegitimate child, or bastard, was a child conceived and
born out of wedlock. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 454-55 (1922); 2 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES 209 (1884). Thus, American jurisdictions have held that absent
clear and convincing proof of bastardy, a child is legitimate if he is born either while
his parents are married or within a normal gestation period following the lawful
dissolution of their marriage. See Parker v. Nothomb, 65 Neb. 315, 318, 93 N.W. 851,
852 (1903); Powell v. State, 84 Ohio St. 165, 168-69, 95 N.E. 660, 661 (1911).
12. See Rowe v. Cullen, 177 Md. 357, 361-62, 9 A.2d 585, 587 (1939). After
noting that the early English common law traced its treatment of illegitimates from
Germanic law, the court discussed the breadth of the discrimination against bastards:
In early times bastardy was considered so disgraceful "that to retain a bas-
tard in a man's house was a reflection and the stain and reproach of the
3
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law13 a bastard was deemedfhius nulhus-a child belonging to no one-and
as such had very few legal rights.14 The illegitimate offspring could not in-
parents." Crime dwelt always upon him so that he could not be admitted
to feudal service. He was treated by the common law with great strictness,
and was allowed but few privileges. For example, he was denied all rights
as an heir, and he was not entitled even to a name, although he might gain
one by reputation. He did not take his mother's place of settlement, but
was settled wherever he chanced to be born. As he was related to nobody
he could have no heirs, except of his own body; and if so he left no descend-
ants, his property escheated. He was incapable of holy orders, and was dis-
qualified from holding any dignity in the church. In Germany, no farther
back than the time of the Reformation, bastards could not give evidence on
the rights of citizens, and down to a very recent period certain Saxon local
laws enacted that no persons of illegitimate birth should officiate in any
judicial office. Inquiries were made into the birth of a person, at the acade-
mies and schools, before he was admitted to the degree of a doctor, or of any
other high dignity.
Id. at 361, 9 A.2d at 587 (quoting 7 AM. JUR. Bastards § 136, at 712-13 (1937)) (foot-
note omitted).
Similarly, under thirteenth century French law, it was clear "that the bastard
was a stranger to his family and an inferior person in society." Fritz,Judgng the Status
of the Illegitimate Child in Various Western Legal Systems, 23 Loy. L. REV. 1, 11 (1977).
While parental support obligations were acknowledged by statute as early as the six-
teenth century, other restrictions on the rights of bastards were not lifted until the
past two centuries. Id. at 11-12. For an historical development of the law relating to
illegitimate children under Roman, French, English, and American law, see id pas-
sim. See also H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§§ 5.1-5.4 (1968) (analyzing the sources and content of American laws on illegiti-
mates); Comment, Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1902) (discussing
the relative influence of Roman civil and canon law on illegitimates upon the English
and American legal systems).
13. While certain limits on the rights of bastards were retained under early Eng-
lish common law, the scope of discrimination against illegitimates in England was
considerably less than the mistreatment in other cultures. See F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 396-97 (2d ed. 1899). The authors
stated as follows:
In our English law bastardy can not be called a status or condition. The
bastard can not inherit from his parents or from anyone else, but this seems
to be the only temporal consequence of his illegitimate birth . . . . In all
respects he is the equal of any other free and lawful man, so far as the
temporal law is concerned. This is well worthy of notice, for in French and
German customs of the thirteenth century, bastardy is often a source of
many disabilities, and sometimes the bastard is reckoned among the
"rightless."
Id. Pollock and Maitland suggest that the reason for this improved treatment of
illegitimates is the fact that William the Conqueror was himself a bastard: "[I1t well
may be that the divergence of English from continental law [with respect to bas-
tardy] is due to no deeper cause than the subjection of England to kings who proudly
traced their descent from a mighty bastard." Id. at 397. For a general discussion of
the legal and customary disabilities of illegitimates, see J. TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY
103-21 (1982) (analyzing the various barriers of lineage, inheritance, infant mortality,
support, separation from kin, and social ostracism).
14. See J. TEICHMAN, supra note 13, at 60. This was also the case under the
canon law. Id.
[Vol. 29: p. 185
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herit from or through either parent, 15 and neither parent was legally obli-
gated to support it. 16 Moreover, a bastard had no right to the surname of
either parent, 17 and no act by either parent could legitimate the child.1"
Early American case law reflected many of the prejudices against illegit-
imates found in the English Common Law.' 9 However, time has served to
soften the harsh distinctions which were drawn between legitimate and ille-
gitimate children. 20 The area of child support is exemplary of this trend
15. H. CLARK, supra note 12, at 155. Moreover, if the bastard died without a
spouse or any children of his own, his property would escheat to the crown. Id.
16. Fritz, supra note 12, at 25. Seealso I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 459;
H. CLARK, supra note 12, at 155. In terms of maintenance, guardianship and cus-
tody, the bastard child at common law was consideredfhuspopuh, a child belonging
to the state; thus the legal responsibility of support was placed upon the community
instead of the natural parents. H. CLARK, supra note 12, at 25-26.
However, the notion offlhiuspopuh andfihus nullius did not remove all parental
support obligations. While the bastard was considered a child of no one, "no one"
meant no legal person, that is, no man. J. TEICHMAN, supra note 13, at 107. Teich-
man notes that "the mother of an illegitimate child did have a customary obligation
(which eventually became a legal obligation) to care for the child, at least until such
time as she could hand it over to someone else, or until she had it taken away from
her." Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, by 1576 Parliament had passed the Eliza-
bethan Poor Law, which created a method by which the courts, through a pseudo-
criminal procedure, could impose a support obligation upon the father. H. CL.ARK,
supra note 12, at 162. However, while providing some sort of remedy, this law's
"chief purpose was not so much the protection of the child as the relief of the parish
from the expense of supporting the child." Id.
17. Fritz, supra note 12, at 25. However, as Blackstone states, an illegitimate
child could "gain a surname by reputation." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at
459.
18. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 856 (1963) (discuss-
ing the English common law), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). Legitimation could
only occur through specific action by Parliament. Id.
19. See, e.g., Burris v. Burgett, 16 Del. Ch. 10, 139 A. 454 (1927) (common law
principle offihius nulhus, denying rights of inheritance or having heirs, applies in Del-
aware, subject to legislative amendment); Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809, 22 S.E. 153
(1895) (common law prohibition of inheritance by bastard changed only by statute
permitting inheritance from mother); Murrell v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. 334, 126
N.E. 189 (1920) (bastard is without name, kindred, parents, and heritable blood un-
less provided by statute); Rowe v. Cullen, 177 Md. 357, 9 A.2d 585 (1939) (a bastard
isfihus nulhus and has no right of inheritance except as provided by statute permit-
ting inheritance from his mother); Voorhees v. Sharp, 63 N.J. Eq. 216, 49 A. 722
(N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1901) (common law treatment of bastard as kin to nobody changed
only by statute permitting inheritance from mother).
In most jurisdictions, the state code or constitution incorporates the common law
of England to the extent that it is not repugnant to the state constitution or overruled
by a legislative enactment. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. III, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; ALA. CODE § 1-3-1 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (West 1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 2-4-211 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 28, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1969); 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1503 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-1-24
(1980); TEX. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1 (Vernon 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 271
(1972); VA. CODE § 1-10 (1950). See generally E. FREUND, ILLEGITIMACY LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 9 (1919).
20. See Fritz, supra note 12, at 29-41 (tracing the United States Supreme Court's
use of the equal protection clause to invalidate various legal disabilities of illegitimate
children); Wolff & Cirillo, The Bastard's Cause of Action. A Statutory Cause of Aclion jor
1983-84]
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towards ameliorating the disparate treatment of these two groups of
offspring.
2 1
The first step in liberalizing the law with respect to the support of ille-
gitimates involved judicial imposition upon the mother of a duty to support
her illegitimate progeny. 22 This legal obligation was imposed by a number
of courts in spite of the fact that at common law a mother had only a limited
duty to support her illegitimate child. 23 Although never passing directly
upon this issue, the New York courts, in dicta, recognized the existence of
such an obligation. 24 In People ex rel Davenport v. Klng,25 for example, the
court stated that "[tihe mother of a bastard child, as its natural guardian, ut
Illegitimate Children, 19J. FAM. L. 463, 463 (1981) (asserting that bastards are treated
the same as legitimate children in actions for wrongful death, child support, work-
men's compensation, and certain inheritance areas). See also Rowe v. Cullen, 177
Md. 357, 361-62, 9 A.2d 585, 587 (1939). In Rowe, the court stated, "[T]he severity of
those early rules has been relaxed nearly everywhere. Certainly in this country ...
the trend of the law has been to give to illegitimate children the status and privileges
of legitimate children." But see H. CLARK, supra note 12, at 155-56 (noting that the
stigma of illegitimacy seems "greater today than in the Middle Ages," and that "the
law still discriminates against the illegitimate child in ways that can only be charac-
terized as barbarous").
21. Abrogation of the severe common law rules has occurred in other areas also.
See generally note 20, supra.
22. See, e.g., Dickinson's Appeal, 42 Conn. 491, 493 (1875) (bastard is legal child
of his mother, with all concomitant rights and duties); Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109,
110 (1806) (while bastard isflius nulius, mother bound to support him as legal guard-
ian); State ex rel. Mattes v. Juvenile Court, 147 Minn. 222, 224, 179 N.W. 1006, 1006
(1920) ("mother, as guardian by nature of her child, is legally bound to support it");
Friesher v. Symonds, 46 N.J. Eq. 521, 523, 20 A. 257, 259 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1890)
(while bastard isfih'us nulhus, mother as natural guardian has support obligation);
Nine v. Starr, 8 Or. 49, 50 (1879) (mother, as natural guardian is legally obligated to
support illegitimate child).
Judicial amelioration of the common law bias has occurred in other areas as
well. The courts in one jurisdiction, for example, rejected bn toto the fundamental
common law doctrine off/mhus nulius along with all of its concomitant corollaries,
including the rule that an illegitimate child had no inheritable blood. See Eaton v.
Eaton, 88 Conn. 286, 91 A. 196 (1914) (illegitimate issue permitted to share in the
income of a testamentary trust); Dzikinson's Appeal, 42 Conn. at 491 (allowing illegiti-
mate children to inherit by representation through their mother). Most jurisdictions,
however, have retained the common law principle denying inheritance to illegiti-
mates, only recognizing such a right where it was conferred by statute. See, e.g., Bur-
ris v. Burgett, 16 Del. Ch. 10, 139 A. 454 (1927) (denying inheritance by illegitimate
children as against claims by children born in lawful wedlock); Hardesty v. Mitchell,
302 Il1. 369, 134 N.E. 745 (1922) (denying the rights of inheritance by representation
to an illegitimate where the statute did not "expressly by necessary implication" con-
fer such a right); Karenius' Estate, 170 Misc. 652, 11 N.Y.S.2d 44 (permitting illegiti-
mate relatives to inherit by representation since statute had altered the common
law).
23. See J. TEICHMAN, supra note 13.
24. See, e.g., People v. John Mitchell, 44 Barb. 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1865); Peo-
ple ex rel. Davenport v. Kling, 6 Barb. 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849).
25. 6 Barb. 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849). In Klhg, the mother of an illegitimate
child sought a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the father had illegally and with
force taken the child from her custody. Id. at 366-67. Although according to the
common law the mother had a right to custody superior to that of the father, the
[Vol. 29: p. 185
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bound to maintain a', and is entitled to the control of it."'26 A few years later,
the same court in People v. Mitchell 2 7 commented that the law has "always
secured to the mother of a bastard child its care, custody and possession."' 28
Although most jurisdictions waited for legislative action to take any further
steps in the area of support, 29 one progressive court also imposed upon the
father a non-statutory duty to support his illegitimate child.
30
In reaction to the disparate treatment of illegitmate children at com-
mon law, most, if not all, states eventually enacted statutes in an attempt to
ameliorate the biases against these individuals. 3 1 This liberalization oc-
court refused to order the father to deliver the child to the mother in light of her
impoverished situation and unstable mental condition. Id. at 367, 369.
26. Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
27. 44 Barb. 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1865). In Mitchell, the mother brought an
action to compel the father to provide support for his illegitimate child, as mandated
by a prior court decree. Id. at 345-47. Since a legislative enactment imposed a duty
of support upon the father, the court found in favor of the mother. Id. at 248-50.
28. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
29. See note 30 and accompanying text ifra.
30. Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 P. 619 (1923). The Doughty court
began its analysis by noting that blind adherence to the common law rule denying
support obligation in the father ignores "the question whether the rule is so repug-
nant to present-day conceptions of social obligations that courts should refuse to fol-
low it." Id. at 583, 211 P. at 619. After noting that the absence of a common law
support obligation was not unique to illegitimate children, the court found that the
evolving duty of child support arose from the status of parenthood. Id. at 585-86, 211
P. at 619-20. Since the parents' marital status, and the child's legitimacy status were
irrelevant to their responsibility for bringing the child into the world, the court held
that there was a non-statutory obligation of support for both the mother and the
father. Id. One learned commentator on the subject called Doughty an "enlightened
American case." H. CLARK, supra note 12, at 155 n.7.
The New York courts have never imposed a non-statutory duty of support on
the father. See People v. Mitchell, 44 Barb. at 249 (father not chargeable with child
support for bastard in any other way than [sic] that provided by the statute); People ex
rel Davenport v. King, 6 Barb. at 367-68 ("[ilt is only by provision of statute, and the
intervention of public offices, that the father can be compelled to support [the bas-
tard child]").
31. See 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards § 8 (1963). For a representative sampling of
New York statutes which exemplifies societal changes in attitude vis-a-vis illegiti-
mates and attempts to eliminate the biases, both social and legal, directed against
these persons, see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 524 (McKinney 1977) (conferring the status
of legitimacy upon children conceived out of lawful wedlock where the parents have
intermarried even if such marriage is voidable or actually void, and providing that
the provisions of the section shall not operate to divest any rights or interests); id.
§ 33 (conferring legitimate status on children of a common law marriage): Id. § Ill
(requiring consent of parents before illegitimate child may be adopted by others); 1d.
§ 114 (stipulating that there be no mention of a child's illegitimate status in an adop-
tion order); id. § 175 (mandating a presumption of legitimacy as to children con-
cieved prior to the commencement of a divorce preceeding); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS § 1-2.10 (McKinney 1981) (including within the term "issue," as utilized in
a testamentary instrument, illegitimate as well as legitimate descendants, unless the
contrary is indicated (as construed by In re Hoffman, 53 A.D.2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49
(1976)); id. § 3-3.3(b) (including illegitimate offspring within the meaning of the term
"issue," as utilized in the state anti-lapse statute); id. § 4-1.2(a)(1),(2) (providing that
an illegitimate child is to be considered the legitimate child of his mother for inheri-
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curred in the area of support through the enactment of what is commonly
referred to as "paternity legislation."'32 These paternity statutes vary in their
formulation of the parental support obligation. 33 Some enactments provide
tance purposes and further mandating that a child born out of wedlock is also to be
considered the legitimate child of his father for these purposes where certain enumer-
ated criteria are met); id. § 5-4.5 (stipulating that in terms of a wrongful death recov-
ery, an illegitimate child is a distributee of its natural father); N.Y. GEN. CONSTR.
LAW § 59 (McKinney 1951) (requiring that all notices and public papers use the term
"child born out of wedlock" rather than the term "bastard" or "illegitimate child");
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4135 (McKinney 1965) (prohibiting the placement of any
statement regarding illegitimate status on a child's birth certificate); N.Y. WORK.
COMt'. LAW § 2(11) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1983-84) (including in the term "child,"
an illegitimate child which was dependent upon the deceased employee). For discus-
sion of legislative enactments in the area of child support, see notes 32-48, 52 & 53
and accompanying text infra.
For examples of such legislation in other jurisdictions, see ALA. CODE § 26-11-2
(Supp. 1983) (legitimating the bastard child for inheritance purposes where the fa-
ther has followed certain prescribed requirements); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.050 (1983)
(providing for legitimation of the bastard child by acknowledgment, adjudication or
subsequent marriage); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109 (1975) (conferring upon the
illegitimate child the right to inherit from its mother, and also from its father pro-
vided certain statutory requisites have been met); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4-3 (1982)
(permitting an illegitimate child recovery for the wrongful death of its mother); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980) (requiring under most cir-
cumstances the consent of either the mother or the father prior to the adoption by
third parties of a child born out of wedlock); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 193.240 (Vernon
1983) (permitting disclosure of an individual's illegitimate status only upon court
order or upon request by the illegitimate itself); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-115 (1977)
(requiring usage of the term "child born out of wedlock" in place of the terms "bas-
tard" or "illegitimate child" in all public documents or judicial proceedings); N.J.
STAT. ANN. (WEST SUPP. 1983-84) (expressly including illegitimate offspring within
the definition of "dependents" in the state workmen's compensation act); W. VA.
CODE § 42-1-7 (1982) (stipulating that the issue of a void or voidable marriage are to
be considered legitimate); WisC. STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (West 1983) (including illegiti-
mate children within the category of those offspring entitled to recover from the
wrongful death of the mother and, under certain circumstances, the father) (as con-
strued by Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis. 2d 709, 162 N.W.2d 628 (1968)).
32. See H. KRAUSE, II.LEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAl. POLiCY 23 (1971). Al-
though statutes of this type are generally termed "paternity" acts, a few statutes con-
tinue to refer to these enactments as "bastardy" acts. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-
701 (1947). The trend however, is towards renaming any such remaining statutes.
See People ex rel. Covington v. Johnson, 79 Ill. App. 2d 266, 269, 224 N.E.2d 664, 666
(1966) (citing ILL.. REV. STAT. ch. 106 3/4 § 51 (1959)) ("the legislature saw fit to
give this chapter a more imposing and dignified title," in changing its name from
"Bastardy" to "Paternity" Act). For a representative sampling of paternity legisla-
tion, see ALA. CODE §§ 26-12-1 to 26-12-9 (1977 & Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34-701 to 34-719 (1962 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466-160 to
466-178 (West Supp. 1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 501-24 (1981 & Supp.
1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-1101 to 7-1123 (1979 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 511-71 (McKinney 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 13.01-13.43 (Vernon Supp.
1982-83). All 50 states now have paternity statutes providing for the support of the
illegitimate child.
33. See generaly H. KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 22-25 (discussing the parental sup-
port obligation under various state statutes). Some statutes simply address the fa-
ther's support obligation, while others refer to a parental duty to support. Compare
ALA. CODE § 26-12-4 (1977) (referring to a father's obligations) and ARK. STAT. ANN.
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the courts with standards to be utilized in fashioning a support order;34
others leave the courts without any meaningful direction.3 5 Among those
statutes that establish specific criteria from which a court is to fashion a
support award, the standards vary.
36
The New York Legislature has been active in the area of support for the
illegitimate child.3 1 In 1925, New York enacted its first statute requiring
parental support and education of illegitimate offspring.38 The jurisdiction
of this legislation extended to all of New York State, except New York City
and miscellaneous counties. 39 Although no standards from which to fashion
a support award were furnished, the statute did establish that the parents
"are liable for the necessary support and education of the child."'40 Legisla-
tion giving New York City courts power to establish parental support and
§ 34-706 (Supp. 1983) (compelling only paternal support) with CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 466-171 (West Supp. 1983-84) (requiring both the father and the mother, if
the mother is financially capable, to contribute to the support of the child) and N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 545 (McKinney 1983) (recognizing support obligations on the part
of both parents). It is suggested however, that this difference between the statutes is
merely a superficial one since most, if not all, jurisdictions hold that the mother has a
common law obligation to support her illegitimate progeny. See notes 22-28 and
accompanying text supra.
34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 514 (1981) (requiring the court to con-
sider, among other things, "[tihe health, relative economic condition, financial cir-
cumstance, income, including the wages, and earning capacity of the parties,
including the children; [t]he manner of living to which the parties have been accus-
tomed when they were living under the same roof; [t]he general equities inherent in
the situation"); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545 (McKinney 1983) (directing that "the par-
ent or parents possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means to pay weekly
or at other fixed periods a fair and reasonable sum according to their respective
means .. .for such child's support and education").
35. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-171 (West Supp. 1983-84) (simply
directing that the father, and the mother if she is financially able to do so, contribute
to the "support and maintenance" of the child); IDAHO CODE § 7-1105 (1979)
(merely stating that "[e]ach parent of a child born out of wedlock is liable for the
necessary support and education of the child").
36. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
37. For a discussion of these statutes, see notes 38-43, 52 & 53 and accompany-
ing text ihfra. New York is unusual however, in that there developed in this jurisdic-
tion two separate court systems for dealing with these problems, each governed by a
separate set of legislative enactments. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 112 and Practice
Commentary (McKinney 1983). This dual system of courts and legislation resulted
in much confusion. Id. The enactment of the Family Court Act, which provided for
statewide jurisdiction, ended this confusion. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 112 and Prac-
tice Commentary (McKinney 1983).
38. 1925 N.Y. Laws 255 (amending the Domestic Relations Law, 1909 N.Y.
Laws 19). The children's court had jurisdiction over all cases arising under the Do-
mestic Relations Law. 1922 N.Y. Laws 547 (amended 1930) (repealed 1962). Fol-
lowing an amendment in 1930, this legislation became collectively known as the
Children's Court Act. 1930 N.Y. Laws 393 (repealed 1962). The Children's Court
Act was later repealed by the Family Court Act. 1962 N.Y. Laws 688. See N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 111 committee comments (McKinney 1975).
39. 1922 N.Y. Laws 547, § I (amended 1930) (repealed 1962).
40. 1925 N.Y. Laws 255, § 120(1).
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education obligations regarding illegitimate children was enacted in 1929.4
Providing little judicial direction, the act merely stated that "[t]he parents of
a child born out of wedlock are liable for the necessary support and educa-
tion of the child."'42 The act was subsequently amended, however, to pro-
vide that the court, in determining a proper support award, must consider
"the age of the child and the station in life of its mother and the financial
ability of its parents."
'43
Initially, many of these statutes were only marginally effective in pro-
viding assistance to the illegitimate child. 44 In terms of support, court
awards were frequently minimal. 45 Moreover, anything more than a nomi-
nal award was often reduced on appeal.46 The reasons for the inadequacy of
41. 1929 N.Y. Laws 343 (amending the Inferior Criminal Courts Act of the City
of New York, 1910 N.Y. Laws 659).
42. Id. §§ 35, 35-b(1). Section 35-b(1) defines the paternal obligation in accord
with the earlier support provision applicable to areas other than New York City and
selected counties. See notes 38 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
43. 1930 N.Y. Laws § 35-a(4).
44. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text znfra. Support enactments were nev-
ertheless an improvement in the illegitimate child's situation because they provided it
with a statutory claim for support; thus, the child was no longer in a position where it
had to hope that the judiciary would "recognize" the existence of a common law
support obligation. See notes 22-30 and accompanying text supra. See also H.
KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 23. Similarly, in other areas, statutes served to soften the
rigors of the common law. However, even today, such legislative efforts are regarded
by some commentators as inadequate. See H. CLARK, supra note 12, at 159 (discuss-
ing the deficiencies of legitimation statutes); H. KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 6 (noting
that "more often than not" legislative attempts to ameliorate the bias against illegiti-
mates produce "limited" and "narrow" statutes).
45. See, e.g., Fowler v. Rizzuto, 205 Misc. 1088, 132 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1954). In
Fowler, the court ordered support for the illegitimate child in the amount of $25 per
week despite evidence that the father owned stock worth up to $400,000, and had a
net income of up to $52,000 per year. Id. at 1091, 132 N.Y.S.2d at 31. The court
reasoned that since the mother's station in life was one criterion in establishing the
support obligation, the mother's minimal financial worth mandated a similarly mini-
mal child support award, regardless of the father's worth. Id. at 1090-91, 132
N.Y.S.2d at 31. See generally Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N.Y.2d 408, 411, 141 N.E.2d
562, 563, 161 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1957) (when the father was first obliged to support his
bastard child, an award was adequate if it provided the bare necessities, thus
preventing the mother or child from becoming a public charge); Storm v. None, 57
Misc. 2d 342, 344, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517-18 (1968) (tracing statutory perpetuation of
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children concerning support obliga-
tions). For a discussion of the minimal awards under other early support statutes, see
E. FREUND, supra note 19, at 52-54.
46. See, e.g., Commissioner of Public Welfare ex rel. Oertli v. Margulies, 258
App. Div. 952, 17 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1940), discussedtn W. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES 194-95 (1954) (child support order of $25 per week reduced to $15 despite
father's weekly income of $250).
In other areas of concern to illegitimates, the ineffectiveness of early legislation
was also evident. For example, under early statutes which sought to give illegitimate
children inheritance rights, illegitimates faired poorly. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Hitch-
cock, 72 N.H. 340, 56 A. 745 (1903) (construing statute permitting an illegitimate
child to inherit from its mother and providing the mother's ancestors and collateral
heirs rights of inheritance via the illegitimate child to not confer upon such offspring
[Vol. 29: p. 185
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these enactments as applied were twofold: first, the courts felt that, since the
statutes were in derogation of the common law, a narrow construction was
required; 4 7 and second, when confronted with a support issue, the courts
reasoned that since the sole policy behind the statute was indemnification of
the public purse and not protection of the child, the smallest award effectu-
ating that purpose was all that was necessary.
48
Eventually, among a few jurisdictions, a changing rationale became ap-
parent. The New York Court of Appeals in Schaschlo v. Tazshoff,4 9 held that
New York's support legislation should be given a liberal construction.5 0 The
Schaschlo court rejected the mechanically applied rule that a father's support
the right to inherit through its mother); Tuttle v. Woolworth, 74 N.J. Eq. 310, 77 A.
684 (1908) (construing statute conferring inheritance rights upon illegitimate chil-
dren to be applicable only when there were no legitimate progeny surviving).
47. See, e.g., Croan v. Phelps, 94 Ky. 213, 215-16, 21 S.W. 874, 874-75 (1893)
(legislation conferring upon illegitimates the ability to inherit and to transmit an
inheritance must be strictly construed because it is contrary to common law
precepts); Barron v. Zimmerman, 117 Md. 296, 302, 83 A. 258, 260 (1912) (legislation
altering common law rules regarding illegitimates must be strictly construed); Hut-
ton v. Bretsch, 216 N.Y. 23, 24, 109 N.E. 858, 860 (1915) (illegitimate child support
statute must be strictly followed); Kessler v. Anonymous, 18 N.Y.S.2d 278, 278 (Just.
Ct. 1940) (statute contravening common law must be strictly construed); Prager v.
Manowitz, 243 A.D. 284, 286, 276 N.Y.S. 875, 876 (1935) (legislation creating sup-
port obligation for illegitimate child is contrary to common law and must be strictly
construed); In re Wallace's Estate (In re Cross), 197 N.C. 334, 337, 148 S.E. 456, 457
(1929) (statute providing for legitimation of bastard child must be strictly construed
because is in derogation of common law). Such restrictive interpretation of support
statutes led to small support awards. See Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N.Y.2d 408, 411,
141 N.E.2d 562, 563, 161 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1957). A few jurisdictions favored liberal
construction of illegitimacy legislation, regarding such statutes as remedial. See, e.g.,
Spencer v. Burns, 413 Il1. 240, 254-57, 108 N.E.2d 413, 420-21 (1952) (statute confer-
ring rights upon illegitimates should be broadly construed to effectuate the legislative
purposes of removing "the onus of illegitimacy from the unoffending children");
Berry v. Powell, 101 Tex. 55, 104 S.W. 1044, 1045-46 (1907) (statute investing the
illegitimate child with maternally inheritable blood, since remedial in nature, must
be liberally construed). The modem trend is towards broad construction of illegiti-
macy legislation. See 10 AM. JUR. 2D Bastards § 148 (1963).
48. The first statutes required parents to pay support in order to relieve the
community from bearing the financial burden of raising illegitimate children. See
Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N.Y.2d 408, 411, 141 N.E.2d 562, 563, 161 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50
(1957) (sole purpose of the first bastardy law was to protect community from having
either mother or child become a public charge). Thus the award should be "no more
than necessary" to protect community funds. See id.; 10 AM. JUR. 2D Bastards § 127
(1963). See generally H. KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 83-84 (statutory obligation created
by society to shift burden from itself to the father); Note, Wealth of Father Held Material
in Determining Level of Support Duty to Illegitimate Child, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1191, 1192
(1957) (early bastard-support statutes designed to relieve community of expense, and
therefore provided only bare necessities).
49. 2 N.Y.2d 408, 141 N.E.2d 562, 161 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1957). The case involved
an appeal by the father from a lower court order requiring him to pay a certain sum
for the care and maintenance of his illegitimate child. Id. at 408, 141 N.E.2d at 561,
161 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
50. Id. The court stated that in light of the statute's purpose, its provisions
should be liberally construed. Id. The modern trend among the jurisdictions is to-
wards broad construction of illegitimacy statutes. See 10 AM JUR. 2D Bastards § 148
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liability was limited by the mother's station in life, openly embracing as its
primary concern the welfare of the illegitimate child. 5 '
In 1962, in reaction to Schaschlo, the New York Legislature passed the
(1963) ("the decided trend of modern authority is to regard such legislation as basi-
cally remedial and to indulge in a liberal interpretation").
51. 2 N.Y.2d at 411, 141 N.E.2d at 563, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 50. The court openly
disavowed as a primary concern indemnification of the public purse, noting that al-
though this had been "[t]he sole purpose of the first bastardy law," such a policy "no
longer reflects the social philosophy present in the laws of this State." Id. The court
asserted that legislation providing parental support for illegitimate children is instead
"chiefly concerned with the welfare of the child." Id.
Recognizing the inequities inherent in the rejected rule, the court stated that if
such a rule were allowed to stand,
it would mean that an illegitimate child born to an impoverished woman or
one of obviously low station would have to suffer the added misfortune of a
meager support award sufficient only to provide for his needs at that hum-
ble level, regardless of the father's ability to afford a comfortable or advan-
tageous existence.
Id. at 411-12, 141 N.E.2d at 564, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
There appear to be only a few other jurisdictions which have joined New York
in so strongly embracing a policy of promoting the illegitimate child's welfare. See,
e.g., Sullivan v. O'Sullivan, 130 Ind. App. 142, 146, 162 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1959) (the
purpose of the support statute is solely to benefit the illegitimate child); Polk v. Har-
ris, 46 Md. App. 591, 598-99, 420 A.2d 1004, 1008-09 (1980) (the primary concern of
the state's paternity legislation is promotion of the child's welfare and best interests)
(citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 66 A (1981)).
While few states have openly accepted promotion of the illegitimate child's wel-
fare as the paramount goal of support proceedings, most states acknowledge that
such a policy is the guiding principle of custody proceedings concerning illegitimates.
See, e.g., Pi v. Delta, 175 Conn. 527, 400 A.2d 709 (1978) (father of illegitimate child
has same custody rights as divorced father because interests of child are paramount);
In re One Minor Child, 295 A.2d 727 (Del. 1972) (there is "no doubt . . . that the
father of an illegitimate child has the right either to custody . . . or to visitation
when such is found to be in the best interests of the child"); Bazemore v. Davis, 394
A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1978) (best interests of the illegitimate child is the standard used in a
custody dispute between the mother and the father); Gay v. Cairns, 298 N.W.2d 313
(Iowa 1980) (acknowledging that father of illegitimate child has right of visitation
upon establishing that such visitation is in the child's best interests); Bauch v. Shaw,
121 N.H. 562, 432 A.2d 1 (1981) ("proper standard to be used in a custody proceed-
ing is the 'present and future welfare of the child' standard regardless of the child's
legitimacy status at birth"); D. v. B., 298 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1980) ("[a]s in custodial
cases, the question of visitation should be resolved to promote the best interests of the
[illegitimate] child"); State ex rtel. Bennett v. Anderson, 129 W. Va. 671, 41 S.E.2d
241 (1947) (mother's custody rights of illegitimate child are subordinate to child's
best interests); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227
N.W.2d 643 (1975) (determinations of parental rights "are to be made giving para-
mount consideration to the best interests of the child").
As a further indication of judicial concern for the child's well-being, some courts
have begun to order support awards based upon the father's means and the child's
needs instead of limiting support to a mere subsistence level. See Wong v. Wong
Hing Young, 80 Cal. App. 2d 391, 181 P.2d 741 (1947) ("father's duty of support [of
legitimate or illegitimate child] does not end with the furnishing of mere necessities if
he is able to afford more"); Hughes v. Hutt, 50 Pa. 209, 212-13, 455 A.2d 623, 625
(1983) ("[t]he only issues which are to be considered in a support action are the needs
of the child and the means of both parents").
[Vol. 29: p. 185
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Family Court Act. 52 This statute requires "the parent or parents possessed
of sufficient means, or able to earn such means" to pay for the child's support
and education "a fair and reasonable sum"'53 in accordance with their re-
spective means. In applying the Family Court Act, the New York courts
have continued to give highest priority in support determinations to the ille-
gitimate child's welfare.
54
The United States Supreme Court has recently become active in issues
concerning illegitimacy, subjecting to scrutiny under the equal protection
clause of the Constitution legislative enactments which treat legitimate chil-
dren more favorably than their illegitimate counterparts. 55 Although not
52. 1962 N.Y. Laws 686 (codified as amended at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 111-1211
(McKinney 1975)). This act applies to the entire state of New York, including New
York City. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 122 (McKinney 1975).
53. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83). The full text of the
section provides in pertinent part as follows:
In a proceeding in which the court has made an order of filiation, the
court shall direct the parent or parents possessed of sufficient means or able to earn
such means to pay weekly or at other fixed periods a fair and reasonable sum
according to their respective means as the court may determine and apportionfor
such child's support and education, until the child is twenty-one . . . . The
order may also direct each parent to pay an amount as the court may deter-
mine and apportion for the support of the child prior to the making of the
order of filiation . . . .[and] for good cause shown, support may be contin-
ued in the discretion of the court.
Id. (emphasis added).
To carry out this policy, the New York legislature has granted the family court
broad jurisdiction in paternity proceedings: "Except as otherwise provided, the fam-
ily court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings to establish paternity and,
if any such proceedings in which it makes a finding of paternity, to order support."
Id. § 511. The only exception to the Family Court's exclusive original jurisdiction in
this area is where the determination of paternity is involved in an adoption proceed-
ing. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 1-b(l) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83). In this situa-
tion, the jurisdiction does not include any authority to order child support. Id. § 11 -
b(2).
The otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the family court was granted with the
goal of promoting the illegitimate child's welfare by "permit[ting] the Family Court
to draw upon all its resources in protecting and caring for the innocent child of an
illicit relation." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 511 committee comment 2 (McKinney 1975).
Unlike New York, many state legislatures have remained silent as to the policies
underlying their support provisions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-849 D
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.031 (West 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273,
§ 15 (West Supp. 1983); MICH. CoM. LAWS ANN. § 722.712 (1968).
54. See, e.g., In re J. (Anonymous) Children, 50 A.D.2d 890, 377 N.Y.S.2d 530
(1975) (protection of illegitimate child's welfare is the primary purpose of filiation
proceedings); Nardone v. Coyne, 23 A.D.2d 819, 258 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1965) (welfare of
child is the most important factor in evaluating the adequacy of support award),
affd, 18 N.Y.2d 626, 219 N.E.2d 290, 272 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1966). Moreover, the legis-
lature endorsed the policy of promoting the child's welfare under the Family Court
Act. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545 committee comment I (McKinney 1975) (the
needs of the child, the financial ability of the parents, and their total responsibilities
are decisive in support proceedings). For a discussion of the approach taken in other
jurisdictions, see note 51 supra.
55. See Picket v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983) (statute denying illegitimate
child the right to support from its father unless a support or paternity action was
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held to be among those classifications labelled "suspect," illegitimacy classifi-
cations have received meaningful equal protection review.5 6 In Gomez v. Pe-
rez, 57 the Justices were confronted with a statute dealing specifically with the
issue of parental support of the illegitimate child. The legislative enactment
in question embodied the common law rule that a father is under a duty to
support only his legitimate offspring.58 In invalidating the legislation, the
Court asserted that once a state grants to children a right to necessary sup-
commenced prior to the child's attaining the age of two, found constitutionally defec-
tive); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (statute denying illegitimate child the
right to support from its father unless a paternity suit had been commenced prior to
the child's first birthday deemed unconstitutional); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979) (statute requiring only the mother's consent prior to the adoption of an
illegitimate child by others, constitutionally impermissible); Parham v. Hughes, 441
U.S. 347 (1979) (statute permitting the illegitimate child's father to sue for wrongful
death of the child only under certain conditions deemed constitutionally valid); Lalli
v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute denying illegitimate a share in father's intestate
estate unless there had been an order of filation while the father was alive determined
constitutional); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (statute denying illegitimate chil-
dren of foreign immigrants certain preferences in immigration which were accorded
to legitimate children deemed constitutional) (fifth amendment objection); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (statute denying illegitimate children inheritance
from father found unconstitutional); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (statute
denying illegitimates presumption of dependency as accorded legitimate children for
the purpose of obtaining survivor's benefits deemed constitutional) (due process ob-
jection); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (statute denying certain illegiti-
mate children disability insurance payments found unconstitutional) (scrutinized
under fifth amendment due process clause); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam) (statute denying illegitimate children
welfare assistance found constitutionally invalid); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973) (statute denying illegitimate child support from father deemed unconstitu-
tional); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (statute denying
unacknowledged dependent illegitimate children workmen's compensation benefits
following their father's death found constitutionally defective); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (statute denying a hearing to father of illegitimate child prior to
child's adoption by third party held constitutionally invalid); Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971) (statute conditioning illegitimate's intestate distribution from natural
father upon formal acknowledgment by father during his lifetime deemed constitu-
tional); Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (statute denying
mother recovery for the wrongful death of illegitimate child found unconstitutional);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (statute denying illegitimate children recovery
for the wrongful death of their mother deemed unconstitutional). For a discussion of
these decisions, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTONDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 701-13 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as 1983 NOWAK]; Maltz, Illegiti-
macy and Equal Protection, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 831, 832-39.
56. See 1983 NOWAK, supra note 55, at 701. The author states as follows: "The
compelling interest test has not been applied to these classifications, but the justices
will independently review the basis of these classifications to determine if they reason-
ably advance a legitimate government purpose." Id. It is difficult, however, to ascer-
tain from the decisions the exact bounds of such review. See generally id. at 702; Maltz,
supra note 55, at 831.
57. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
58. Id. For a discussion of the common law doctrine that a father had no duty
to support his illegitimate children, see generally note 16 and accompanying text
supra.
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port from their father, there is no constitutionally acceptable justification for
denying this right to an illegitimate child solely because his natural parents
have not married. For a state to take such a position is "illogical and un-
just."59 Similarily, in Pickett v. Brown,6° legislation placing a two-year limit
on an illegitimate child's right to establish paternity and to obtain support
from his natural father was found constitutionally defective in light of the
mandate of the equal protection clause.6 1
The right of an illegitimate child to support from his biological father
has recently been reexamined in light of two recent state court cases involv-
ing a mother's misrepresentation that she was using birth control at the time
she became pregnant with an illegitimate child. In Stephen K v. Roni L .,62
the father, after admitting paternity, cross-claimed for damages in tort, al-
leging that in reliance upon the mother's fraudulent deception, he engaged
in sexual intercourse which resulted in the conception of an unwanted
child. 63 In declining to entertain the tort claim, the California Court of Ap-
peals found that a judicial attempt to correct the social wrong involved in
this case would prove improvident. 64 The Stephen K. court refused to police
the private sexual conduct of two consenting adults, believing that such
court interference would result in unwarranted governmental intrusion into
59. 409 U.S. at 538.
60. 103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983).
61. Id. at 2209. In Pckett, the mother had instituted a paternity and support
action approximately 10 years subsequent to the child's birth. Id. at 2200. The al-
leged father filed a motion to dismiss based upon the statute which provided, in perti-
nent part, that such proceedings "shall not be brought after the lapse of more than
two (2) years from the birth of the child." Id. at 2200, 2201 n.1 (quoting TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-224 (2) (1977)). Prior toPickett, the Court had invalidated a statute
setting a one-year limitation on the right to commence a paternity proceeding. Mills
v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
62. 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980).
63. Id. at 641-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (1980). The father sought general dam-
ages in the amount of $100,000 to compensate for his support obligation to the child
and for the emotional distress and mental anguish he suffered as a result of the
mother's deception and subsequent birth of the child. Id. at 642, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
619. In addition, the father sought punative damages amounting to $100,000. Id.
At trial level, the court sustained without leave to amend, the mother's demurrer
to the father's cross-complaint. Id. at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
64. Id. at 642-43, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20. The Stephen K. court stated:
It does not lie within the power of any judicial system, however, to remedy
all human wrongs. There are many wrongs ...[which] are beyond any
effective legal remedy and any practical administration of law. To attempt
to correct such wrongs or give relief from their effects "may do more social
damage than if the law leaves them alone." The present case falls within
that category.
Id. (quoting Ploscowe, An Aclion For "Wrongful Ltft," 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1078, 1080
(1963)).
Historically, it has not been unusual for a court to at least partially base its
decision on such pragmatic grounds. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 21-22 (4th ed. 1971). See also L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 77-96 (1930).
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an individual's right to privacy. 65 Since the practice of birth control was
thought to be best left with the sexual partners, the court concluded that the
natural father could have taken his own precautionary measures to avoid
conception.
6 6
In Hughes v. Hu/l, 6 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was also con-
fronted with the issue of a mother's tortious misrepresentation. The court
compared the mother's deception with the father's support obligation in
light of the goals of support proceedings. 68 After noting the procedural
prohibitions on the argument raised by the father, the supreme court ex-
plained the policy underlying those restrictions by reaffirming that "[t]he
only issues which are to be considered in a support action continue to be the
needs of the child and the means of both parents." 69 Consequently, the
court concluded that arguments about the mother's misrepresentations that
she was using birth control "have no place in a proceeding to determine
65. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 643, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
The concept that judicial intervention in private rights could constitute state
action sufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional violation had its origin in the
well-known case of Shelley v. Kraemer. See 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See genera/6y 1983 NO-
WAK, supra note 55, at 509. It has never been held, however, that the mere involve-
ment of a court in the protection of rights automatically establishes state action. In
recent years, the trend embarked upon in Shelley to expand state action through the
notion that judicial intervention may imbue private actions with sufficient govern-
mental flavor to give it constitutional significance has been greatly curtailed. See
1983 NOWAK, supra note 55, at 510; Glennon and Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysts of the
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sul. CT. REV. 221, 239; Com-
ment, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840, 841 (1974).
66. 105 Cal. App. at 645, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621. The court explained that even
birth control pills were not completely effective. Id. Therefore, any decision concern-
ing use of contraception, the court concluded, must be a personal one. Id. However,
as a practical matter, there is only one contraceptive device-the condom-available
to men. See Quinby, Contraceptives.- Choosing the One That's Rightfor You, 88 MADEMOI-
SELLE 66 Uan. 1982). This particular device is not as effective as contraceptives
available to women. Id See Frank, Beyond the Pill. Contraceptives of the Future, 88 MAD-
EMOISELLE 139 (Oct. 1982); Women Doctors Talk About Birth Control, 99 LADIES HOME
J. 64 (Sept. 1982).
67. 50 Pa. 209, 455 A.2d 623 (1983).
68. Id. at 212-13, 455 A.2d at 624-25. The father first demanded that a jury
hear his argument that the mother's deception should eliminate his paternity liabil-
ity. Id. at 211, 455 A.2d at 624. The state supreme court agreed with the lower
courts' refusal to grant such a demand, holding that the jury's role is solely to deter-
mine paternity and that any alleged misrepresentation has "no relevance to the ques-
tion of this paternity." Id.
69. Id. at 212-13, 455 A.2d at 625. The father argued that Pennsylvania law
treats a paternity proceeding as a civil action. Id. at 212, 455 A.2d at 624-25 (quoting
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6704(f) (Purdon 1982) (current version at id. § 6704(c)
(Purdon Supp. 1983)). Thus, the father reasoned, he was entitled to assert a counter-
claim pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 209, 455 A.2d at
625. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1031, 1046. The supreme court dismissed the claim with two
comments: first, the civil form of action is only an effort to decriminalize the pro-
ceeding, not broaden the available actions; second, support proceedings are governed
by a unique set of rules, none of which can be read to authorize the father's claim. 50
Pa. at 212, 455 A.2d at 625. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1910.1-.31.
[Vol. 29: p. 185
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A federal constitutional issue regarding an individual's right to privacy
arises in cases where a state imposes a support obligation on the father in
instances where the mother's misrepresentation as to her use of contraception
led to the birth of an illegitimate child. 71 The Supreme Court's first express
acknowledgement of the existence of such a right of privacy occurred in Gris-
woldo. Connecti'cut. 72 Confronting a statute prohibiting married persons from
using contraceptives, the Griswold Court found an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the right to privacy in the marital relationship. 73 In E'senstadt v.
Baid,74 the Court expanded upon this concept by recognizing the right of a
70. 50 Pa. at 212, 455 A.2d at 625. The court felt its conclusion was compelled
by the following factors: (1) the possibility of fabricated accusations; (2) the less than
certain effectiveness of birth control methods; and (3) the fact that claims like the one
asserted by the father, if successful, could result in the denial of support to innocent
children whom the support law was designed to protect. Id.
71. See Stephen K. v. RontL., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
The concept of an individual right to privacy in sexual matters can be traced to
Skinnerv. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See NOWAK, supra note 4, at 624-25. In this
1942 opinion, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute that
permitted sterilization of persons convicted of certain crimes three or more times.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535. The statute at issue was Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act, 1935 Okla. Sess. Laws 26, art. I (held unconstitutional 1942). The
act defined "habitual criminal" as a person who, having been convicted at least twice
of "felonies involving moral turpitude," is convicted again of a "felony involving
moral turpitude" and sentenced to imprisonment. Id. § 3. Anyone who was ruled a
habitual offender, pursuant to the act's provisions, was to be "sexually sterilized." Id.
§ 4.
The Court's holding of unconstitutionality was based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 316 U.S. at 538. Of relevance, however, is the
fact that the opinion, although not mentioning a right of privacy in sexual matters,
did establish marriage and procreation as interests of important constitutional signifi-
cance. Id. at 541. See generally NOWAK, supra note 4. The Court asserted, "We are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Mar-
riage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." d.
72. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Seegenerally NOWAK, supra note 4, at 625-27.
73. 381 U.S. at 479. The statute in Grirwold provided that "[a]ny person who
uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing concep-
tion shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor
more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32
(1958) (repealed 1971). In addition, Connecticut law provided that "[a]ny person
who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender." Id. § 54-196.
The two appellants in the case had been convicted for giving information on birth
control to married persons. 381 U.S. at 480.
After tracing the development of the right to privacy under the Constitution, the
Court noted that it was addressing "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" and "a law which ...
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship." Id. at 485. The Court concluded that it was "deal[ing] with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . .Marriage is . . .intimate to the degree of
being sacred." Md. at 486.
74. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
1983-84]
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single person to have the same access to contraceptives as a married per-
son.75 Further, in Carey v. Population Services International,76 the Justices again
acknowledged the right to decide for oneself whether or not to avoid procre-
ation through the use of contraception.
77
Against this background, the New York Court of Appeals faced the is-
sue of whether misrepresentation by a mother concerning her use of contra-
ception may be asserted by the natural father of an illegitimate child as a
75. Id. at 453. The statute under attack in Eisenstadt provided a maximum five-
year imprisonment for "whoever sells, lends, gives away, exhibits or offers to sell, lend
or give away. . . any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the preven-
tion of conception," except as permitted in § 21A. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
§ 21 (West 1970) (held unconstitutional 1972). Section 21A provided as follows:
A registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married
person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or concep-
tion. A registered pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy
may furnish such drugs or articles to any married person presenting a pre-
scription from a registered physician.
Id. § 21A. The appellee had been convicted for displaying contraceptives at a lecture
on the subject, and for giving an unmarried adult woman a package of vaginal foam.
405 U.S. at 440.
In invalidating the legislation, the Court stressed the individual nature of the
right, defining it as "the right of the idividual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in origi-
nal). See generally, Comment, The Right of Privaq: A Black View of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777, 811 (1980); Note, Expandng the Right of
Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1981).
76. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
77. Id. The constitutionality of New York's restrictions on access to birth con-
trol were discussed in Carey. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The New York law prohibited the
sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors under 16 years of age, the sale or
distribution of contraceptives to anyone 16 years of age or older by anyone other than
a licensed pharmacist, and the display or advertisement of any contraceptives. N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972) (held unconstitutional 1976). One of the
appellees was Population Planning Associates, Inc., a corporation engaged in the
sale, through mail order, of various nonmedical contraceptive devices. 431 U.S. at
682. In finding the statute contrary to constitutional mandates, the Court asserted
that "the constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to an individual's liberty
to make choices regarding conception . . . . Id. at 685.
The Court in Roe v. Wade had previously recognized as fundamental a woman's
right to decide whether or not to have a child. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In
deeming a statute limiting a woman's right to an abortion unconstitutional, the Wade
Court also emphasized the individual, or personal, nature of the right and held that
the right of privacy encompasses "a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy." Id. at 152-53. The statutes in question made it a crime to obtain an
abortion unless it was obtained "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Id.
at 117-18 & n.l (discussing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-1194, 1196 (Vernon
1925) (held unconstitutional 1973)). The plaintiff, an unmarried pregnant woman,
was seeking a declaratory judgment that the abortion statutes were unconstitutional.
Id. at 120.
As the cases illustrate, governmental interference with one's right to privacy, a
fundamental right, invokes substantial judicial scrutiny. See generally 1983 NOWAK,
supra note 55, at 418-19, 458-59 & 492-94.
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defense to his support obligation. 78 The court began its analysis by estab-
lishing that the primary concern in a paternity proceeding is the well-being
of the child. 79 Such a policy, the court pointed out, is reflected in the pater-
nity provisions of the Family Court Act which require consideration of only
two factors in fashioning a support award: the child's needs and the parents'
financial ability to meet those needs.8 0 In light of this policy, the court
maintained that an inquiry into the respective fault of the mother or father
in causing the child's conception was neither contemplated by the legisla-
ture, nor jurisdictionally permissible.8' Therefore, the court concluded that
the father may not raise as a defense in a support proceeding the mother's
deliberate misrepresentations as to her use of contraception.
2
The court next addressed the appellant's contention that the mother's
misrepresentation regarding contraception served to deprive him of his con-
stitutional right to privacy: his right to choose whether or not to father a
child.8 3 Conceding that the mother's conduct did not, in itself, involve state
action, the father argued that the court's action in ordering him to pay sup-
port in this situation constituted sufficient state involvement to give rise to a
constitutional claim.8 4 Assuming, without deciding, that sufficient state ac-
tion existed, the court acknowledged that a man has a fundamental right to
decide whether or not to father a child. 85 However, the court concluded
that since the mother's conduct did not in any way interfere with the father's
right to use contraception, the interest asserted by Frank S. was not actually
"his freedom to choose to avoid procreation."'8 6 Rather, the court character-
ized his interest as the right to avoid a child support obligation arising out of
a relationship between two private parties.8 7 Under constitutional analysis,
the court reasoned that the protected right "involves the freedom to decide
78. 59 N.Y.2d at 4, 449 N.E.2d at 714, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
79. Id. at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. The primary objective, the
court noted, is no longer to prevent the child from becoming a public ward. Id. For
a thorough examination of the shift in objectives from concern over expenditures of
public monies to the welfare of the child, see notes 16, 45, & 48-54 and accompanying
text supra.
80. 59 N.Y.2d at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. For the text of
§ 545 of the Family Court Act, see note 53 supra. For a discussion, of the legislature's
affirmative embrace of this policy of promoting the child's welfare as the polestar of
the Family Court Act, see notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
81. 59 N.Y.2d at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. The court stated
that since the principal objective of a paternity proceeding and the establishment of a
support award is to promote the child's wellbeing, "the Family Court, as a court of
limitedjursdction, is simply not theproperforum for adjudicating disputes existing solely
between the parents." Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 5-6, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
84. Id. at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
85. Id. at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 715-16, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821-22 (citing Carey, 431 U.S.
at 678; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438). For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Carey
and Eienstadt, see notes 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
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for oneself, without unreasonable governmental interference, whether to
avoid procreation through the use of contraception." 88 Nonetheless, the
right to privacy, stated the court, has never been extended so as to regulate
the conduct of private parties.8 9 The L. Pamela P. court noted that a judicial
determination of the validity of such a constitutional claim may itself consti-
tute impermissible state action.90 In conclusion, the court indicated that no
matter how unfair the conduct of the mother in not affording the father an
equal voice in the child's conception, her action did not give rise to a consti-
tutional wrong.
9 1
In reviewing the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in L. Pamela
P., it is submitted that the court reached a decision wholly consonant with
the general purpose of the Family Court Act when it based its prohibition of
the defense of misrepresentation on jurisdictional grounds.9 2 Although a lit-
eral reading of the family court's jurisdictional grant fails to reveal an ex-
press prohibition ofjurisdiction over the defense of misrepresentation, 93 such
a jurisdictional preclusion can reasonably be inferred from the language of
the support statute94 and its legislative history.95
As the New York Court of Appeals correctly noted, the family court is
limited by the Family Court Act to a consideration of two factors in fashion-
ing a support order: the needs of the child and the means of the parent.
96
Furthermore, since the drafters of the Act indicated that the family court's
goal in fashioning an order is to protect the welfare of the child, 9 7 to enter-
tain the defense would fail to promote the very purpose for which the court
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added). The Court found that the father's attempt to raise the
constitutional issue was not an effort to prevent others from infringing upon his right
of privacy; rather, it was an effort to force others to compromise their privacy right in
deference to his choice. Id.
90. Id. (citing Stephen K. v. RoniL., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
618). For a discussion of Stephen K., see notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
91. 59 N.Y.2d at 6-7, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
92. For a discussion of the court's reasoning concerning the lack of family court
jurisdiction, see notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
proposition that the child's welfare and the parent's means are the only relevant
considerations in a support proceeding, see notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
93. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. §§ 115, 511 (McKinney 1975). For a discussion of
the family court's jurisdiction, see note 53 supra.
94. See note 96 and accompanying text zifra. For the text and analysis of § 545,
the support order provision, see notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 97-100 and accompanying text n/ra. For a discussion of the com-
mittee comments regarding the support order and jurisdiction provisions, which sug-
gest the absence of any concern about the mother's deception, see notes 53 & 54supra.
96. 59 N.Y.2d at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821. For the text of the
provision establishing the criteria imposing a support obligation, see note 53 supra.
There is no mention in the statute of any other factors that warrant consideration.
See id.
97. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. art. 1 practice commentaries (McKinney 1975) (quot-
ing Committee Comments, Joint Legilative Committees on Court Reorgamzation 3420). This
legislative commentary indicates the legislature's affirmative acceptance of the prin-
ciple openly espoused by the court as the polestar of New York's illegitimacy legisla-
[Vol. 29: p. 185
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was created. 98 Moreover, a finding that the legislature intended to make the
defense of misrepresentation available to a father would not comport with
the trend in New York law towards promoting the welfare of the bastard
child, 99 a trend exemplified in the Family Court Act.i°° It is thus submitted
that the court was correct in finding a jurisdictional bar to an issue which
stemmed from a dispute "existing solely between the parents,"'' 0 and which
did not in any way serve to promote the child's welfare.'
0 2
It is suggested that the court's conclusion that no recognized aspect of
the father's right to privacy was violated by the mother when she fraudu-
lently deceived him, was a correct application of constitutional principles.1
0 3
While the father has a constitutionally protected fundamental right to
tion: promotion of the child's welfare. For further discussion of the legislative
approval of this principle, see notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of these purposes, see notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text
supra. On the other hand, it could be argued that the child's welfare wouldnot be compro-
mired in any way by permitting the defense of fraud and deceit to be asserted. The
family court did not hold that recognition of this defense would relieve the defendant
of all support obligations. See 59 N.Y.2d at 4 & n.*, 449 N.E.2d at 715 & n.*, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 821 & n.*. Instead, the family court placed limitations upon this defense
such that a court's acceptance of this type of claim would result in the child receiving
the same overall amount of support as it would have received had the defense not
been permitted and the usual support allocation rule been applied. See id. The only
difference between allowing the defense as delineated by the family court and not
permitting it to be asserted lies in the proportion of support that each parent would
be called upon to bear. Id. Under the family court's ruling, the father is relieved of
his support obligation only to the extent that the mother is able to provide for the
child's needs herself. Id. The family court stated, however, that the rule must be
applied "without detriment to the child" and that "the child is entitled . . . to no less
a standard of living than his father's." 110 Misc. 2d at 985, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 348
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, "the child ...cannot be relegated to a public
assistance standard." Id.
However, the fact that such a rule does not compromise the child's financial
status is not a cogent argument in favor of its application since the criterion is
whether the support award promotes the child's welfare, not whether it is a detriment
to this individual's well-being. For a discussion of this policy, see notes 53-54 & 97
and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that an inquiry into the fraud and
deceit of the mother in causing the child's conception is purely a controversy between
the two parents, the resolution of which in no way promotes the child's interest. For
a discussion of the proposition that some legal inquiries may do more harm than
good, see notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
99. For a discussion of the development of the legislative and judicial protection
afforded to illegitimate children in New York State, see notes 22-28, 31-34 & 37-54
and accompanying text supra.
100. For a discussion of the Family Court Act's consistency with the policy of
promoting the child's welfare, see notes 53-54 & 97 and accompanying text supra.
101. 59 N.Y.2d at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 715, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
102. For a discussion concluding that although such an inquiry would not harm
the child, it would nevertheless fail topromote the child's well-being, see note 98 supra.
For an analysis of the court's agreement that the legislature did not envision the
availability of this defense, see notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
103. For a discussion of Frank S.'s constitutional contention and the court's rea-
soning in dismissing this argument, see notes 83-91 and accompanying text supra.
1983-841
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choose for himself whether to father a child, 10 4 the Supreme Court has de-
fined this procreative right in terms of an individual's right to make choices as
to sterilization and an individual's right to obtain contraceptive devices in
order to avoid procreation. 0 5 The interest sought to be protected by the
father in L. Pamela P. was not his individual right to have access to contracep-
tion so as to avoid procreation; as the court correctly stated, "the mother's
conduct in no way limited his right to use contraception."1 0 6 Rather, he
sought "to have his choice regarding procreation fully respected by other
individuals and effectuated to the extent that he should be relieved of his
obligation to support" his child. 10 7 Pamela P.'s failure to allow him equal
say in the decision to have a child, however wrong, "should not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation."'
' 0 8
A recognition by the L. Pamela P. court of an inability to remedy all
human wrongs without engendering further social damage would, it is sub-
mitted, in itself be a policy ground sufficient to bar any claim or defense of
fraud and deceit. A recognition of this public policy played an integral part
in the court's decision to dismiss a similar action for tortious misrepresenta-
tion in Stephen K., 10 9 a case favorably acknowledged by both the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Hughes," 0 and the New York Court of Appeals
in L. Pamela P." 'I In ascertaining the likelihood of any social damage which
104. 59 N.Y.2d at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 715-16, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 821-22 (citing Carey,
431 U.S. at 678; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438). For a discussion of the Court's analysis
in Carey and Etsenstadt, see notes 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
105. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's development of this individual
right to privacy, see notes 71-77 and accompanying text supra.
106. 59 N.Y.2d at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 822. For an analysis of
the court's conclusion that the father's individual rights were not violated, see notes
86-91 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the contraceptive options
available to a father, see note 66 supra.
107. 59 N.Y.2d at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 822. For a discussion of
the court's analysis of this issue, see note 89. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's analysis of this argument, see notes 68-70 and accompanying text
supra.
108. 59 N.Y.2d at 6-7, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 822. The court stated
that the father's "constitutional entitlement to avoid procreation does not encompass
a right to avoid a child support obligation simply because another private person has
not fully respected his desires in this regard." Id.
The court seemed to indicate, however, that had the father's right to privacy
been involved, judicial intervention might itself constitute an invasion of Frank S.'s
constitutional right. Id. at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (citing Stephen
K. v. Roni'L., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618). For a discussion of the
assertion of this proposition by the Stephen K. court, see note 65 and accompanying
text supra. This concept, by which the court is in effect acknowledging that an order
mandating support constitutes sufficient government action to invoke constitutional
proscriptions, rests upon a tenuous application of current constitutional interpreta-
tion. See note 65 supra.
109. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618. For a discussion of the facts
and analysis of Stephen K., see notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
110. 50 Pa. at 209 n.2, 455 A.2d at 625 n.2. For a discussion of the facts and
analysis of Hughes, see notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
111. 59 N.Y.2d at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
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might ensue from allowing the misrepresentation defense in a support ac-
tion, the question arises as to whether in the first instance, it is proper for a
court to delve into the private conduct of the parents, 112 and further
whether the results of such an inquiry should result in a denial of support to
an innocent third party, the child.'' 3 The difficulty which could occur in
defining the parameters of such a defense could open a pandora's box of
litigation problems. 1 14 For example, if the misrepresentation defense were
permitted, the issue of whether a court should entertain this defense in a
hearing for support of a legitimate child would arise. Although it is quite
possible that a court would not recognize the defense, 15 disallowing the de-
fense in cases involving legitimate children while permitting its use in hear-
ings involving illegitimate children would raise serious equal protection
issues. 116
In view of the court's narrow holding denying the family court jurisdic-
tion to entertain the misrepresentation defense, it is suggested that the im-
pact of this decision upon support proceedings in other jurisdictions will be
limited."I 7 The strict holding of the New York Court of Appeals should also
112. Id. at 4, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 822. As the court stated,
"[judicial inquiry into so fundamentally private and intimate conduct as is required
to determine the validity of [the father's] assertions may itself involve impermissible
state interference with the privacy of these individuals." Id. For a discussion of this
consideration by the Stephen K. court, see note 65 and accompanying text supra.
113. Hughes v. Hutt, 50 Pa. at 209, 455 A.2d at 625. For a discussion of the
Hughes court's view, see note 70 and accompanying text supra.
114. For a discussion of Stephen K. court's recognition of this problem, see note
65 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Hughes court's view that
these concerns weigh against judicial resolution of this matter, see note 70 and ac-
companying text supra. See also L. GREEN, supra note 64, at 76-96; W. PROSSER, supra
note 64, at 21-22.
115. The family court; in permitting the father to assert the defense of fraud and
deceit, briefly mentioned this question. 110 Misc. 2d at 982, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
Though refusing to address the issue as relevant to the instant case, the family court
did state that "marriage is ordinarily deemed to represent a willingness to procreate."
This dictum suggests that at least the New York Family Court would not permit such
a claim or defense in a marital situation. Id.
116. Under the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, classi-
fications distinguishing illegitimate from legitimate children are unconstitutional if
they fail to reasonably promote a permissible government purpose or if they place a
burden on the illegitimate child qua illegitimate child. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's efforts in policing illegitimacy legislation through use of the equal
protection clause, see notes 55-61 and accompanying text supra. See also NOWAK,
supra note 4, at 601.
117. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the jurisdiction issue in light of
the support statute's goal of promoting the child's welfare, see notes 79-82 & 96-102
and accompanying text supra.
The legislation on illegitimacy in force in most states is silent as to the purpose
of, or policy behind, support provisions and few states have gone as far as New York
in openly embracing promotion of the child's welfare as a primary policy. For exam-
ples of statutes lacking criteria for support awards or express policy goals, see note 35
supra. For a discussion of the paucity of states which have adopted the paramount
goal of promoting the child's welfare, see note 51 supra. The open acceptance of such
a policy may not be far away, however, and for those statutes that are deemed to
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have little effect on other claims which might arise out of a mother's fraudu-
lent deception in conceiving a child.'"" Application of the principles set
forth in L. Pamela P. to tort or contract claims could occur only if a court
chooses to follow the court of appeals' dicta asserting that judicial inquiry
into intimate conduct may rise to the level of a constitutional violation.' 19
Currently, only three state courts have ruled on the effect of a mother's
misrepresentation as to her use of contraception. 12 0 All three refused to
reach the merits of the misrepresentation contention.'21 In light of the sen-
sative nature of the interests involved, perhaps, as these courts realized, this
is an issue best kept out of the legal system.' 2 2 Although it is uncertain
embody this purpose, L. Pamela P. v. Frank S. will provide a rationale by which a
court could bar the father's defense. For a discussion of cases in which various juris-
dictions have adopted such a policy in custody and visitation proceedings, or have
required support based upon the father's ability to pay rather than basic necessities,
see note 51 supra. For a discussion of the court's analysis that a defense of misrepre-
sentation is inconsistent with the goal of promoting the child's welfare, see notes 96-
102 and accompanying text supra.
118. Such an action on the part of the mother could theoretically give rise to
both tort and contract claims.
The assertion of such a claim under tort theory has already been attempted. See
Stephen K v. RomL., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618. For a discussion
of Stephen K., see notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra. However, the Stephen K.
court refused to entertain this claim on broad public policy grounds and thus did not
reach the question as to whether tort liability existed. Id. at 642-45, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
619-20.
A breach of contract action against the mother for engaging in such action has
not yet been attempted, however this claim would not be far-fetched in terms of
contract principles. See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1952). Such a
contract, if it were found to exist, could however, be deemed to be "contrary to pub-
lic policy" and thus declared illegal. See id. at 1160-62.
119. As to whether such judicial inquiry would itself rise to the level of a consti-
tutional wrong, see note 65 supra. Regarding the court's seeming approval of Stephen
K., a decision which further articulated policy rationales favoring the barring of any
claim or defense of this type, see 59 N.Y.S.2d at 6, 449 N.E.2d at 716, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
822. For a discussion of the policies espoused in Stephen K., see notes 62-66 and ac-
companying text supra.
120. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618; L.
Pamela P. v. Frank S., 59 N.Y.2d at 1,449 N.E.2d at 713, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 819; Hughes
v. Hutt, 50 Pa. at 209, 455 A.2d at 623. That no legislative proclamation exists, see
Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
121. One jurisdiction denied the derivation of an action for tortious misrepre-
sentation. Stephen K . Roni'L., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 618. For a
discussion of the analysis in Stephen K., see notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
Two jurisdictions have ruled that misrepresentation does not give rise to a defense to
the obligation of child support. L. Pamela P., 59 N.Y.2d at 1, 449 N.E.2d at 713, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 819; Hughes v. Hutt, 50 Pa. 209, 445 A.2d 623 (1983). For a discussion
of the court's analysis in L. Pamela P., see notes 78-91 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of the court's analysis in Hughes, see notes 67-70 and accompanying
text supra.
122. See notes 64, 70, 112 & 115-16 and accompanying text supra.
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whether other jurisdictions will follow those rulings if confronted with simi-





123. Most jurisdictions have not yet been confronted with this issue. See note
121 and accompanying text supra. For a statement on the pervasiveness of social
conditions that give rise to such an issue, see Stephen K v. Ron,'L., 105 Cal. App. 3d at
642, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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